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Docket No. 39844 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christopher Mark Taylor appeals from the district court's Judgment 01 Conviction 
Upon Plea of Guilty to Two Felony Counts, Count One, Aggravated Battery on a Police 
Officer, Idaho Code§§ 18-903, 18-907, 18-915, Count Five, Aggravated Assault on a 
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Peach Officer, Idaho Code§§ 18-901, 18-905, 18-915, both counts including both 
deadly weapon and persistant violator enhancements; in which the district court 
imposed and executed unified sentences of fixed life, no indeterminate, each sentence 
to run concurrent. (R., 248-255). Mr. Taylor asserts that, in light of the unique facts of 
this case, the sentences are excessive and an abuse of discretion. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Taylor pleaded guilty to Aggravated Battery on a Police Officer as defined in 
I.C.§§ 18-903(a), (b) and/or (c), 18-907(1)(a) and/or (b), 18-915(1)(b), with the statutory 
firearm enhancement as defined in I.C. § 19-2514, and Aggravated Assault on a Police 
Officer as defined in I.C. §§ 18-901(a) and/or (b), 18-905(a) and/or (b) and 18-915(1)(b). 
In addition, Mr. Taylor admitted to being a persistent violator as defined in I.C. § 19-
2514. (R., 248-255). 
The forgoing statement of facts is summarized from the statement of facts 
contained in Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, and were not in dispute. (R., 186-
187). At approximately 5:00 o'clock pm on February 7, 2011, Mr. Taylor was observed 
driving by Jerome City Police Officer Dennis Clark at a speed over the posted speed 
limit. Clark recognized Mr. Taylor and was apparently aware that his driving privileges 
were suspended at that time. Clark attempted to make a traffic stop. Mr. Taylor did not 
stop his vehicle. Instead, his speed gradually increased. Mr. Taylor reached a residence 
at 300 South and 51 East in Jerome, Idaho, where the vehicle's driver side door opened 
briefly. Officer Clark pulled in about two car lengths behind Mr. Taylor' veLic!e with his 
gun drawn and pointed at Mr. Taylor. At that point, the driver's side door again closed, 
and the vehicle turned around and began driving to the east on 300 South. (R., 186-
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187). 
During the pursuit, Officer Clark momentarily lost sight of the vehic;e as it came 
over a small hill. When he regained sight of the vehicle, it was stopped in the roadway 
and Mr. Taylor was standing outside of the vehicle with a shotgun. Officer Clark stopped 
his vehicle approximately 50 feet from Mr. Taylor' vehicle and observed Mr. Taylor point 
the shotgun at his patrol car. Officer Clark ducked to the right and Mr. Taylor fired one 
shot with the shotgun at the patrol car. The officer was struck above the left eye with a 
pellet from the shotgun. (R., 186-187). 
At that time, Officer Clark rammed the Defendant's vehicle with his patrol car, but 
Mr. Taylor returned to his vehicle and began driving back the other direction. At that 
point, Officer Clark exited his patrol car and fired several shots at Mr. Taylor. By this 
time, several other members of various branches of law enforcement had joined the 
pursuit. Jerome City Police Officer Scott Novak had positioned his patrol vehicle so that 
Mr. Taylor was driving towards it. The vehicle was located halfway in the roadway and 
halfway off the road. Officer Novak had exited his vehicle and positioned himself at the 
passenger side rear quarter panel, with his gun drawn in the "ready" position. Officer 
Novak would testify that as Mr. Taylor' vehicle was approaching his position; it drifted 
from the right lane, towards his vehicle, which was parked on the opposite side of the 
road. Officer Novak moved away from his vehicle, to avoid being struck in the event Mr. 
Taylor' vehicle struck his patrol car. He then fired two shots at Mr, Taylor' vehicle. (R., 
187). 
Mr. Taylor would testify that he saw Officer Novak with his firearm pointed at Mr. 
Taylor, and ducked as he was driving by that position, to avoid being shcf in the face or 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page 3 
head. He never intended to swerve towards Officer Novak. {R., 187). 
Officer Clark was still in pursuit of Mr. Taylor' vehicle at that time, and shortly 
after made the decision to ram Mr. Taylor' vehicle off the roadway. The vehicle crashed, 
and Mr. Taylor was arrested by several officers without significant further :ncident. Mr. 
Taylor had been shot in the hand and had serious lacerations on his head. He was 
transported to the hospital. (R., 187). 
Officer Clark was life-flighted after the incident, and ultimately underwent three 
surgeries to remove the BB from above his eye. He remains blind in his left eye. (R., 
187). 
Mr. Taylor filed a Rule 35 Motion for reduction of sentence. (R., p.84.) The 
district court denied the motion. (Tr. 3/30/09 pg.9, L.12 - pg.11, L.9; R., p.88.). 
Mr. Taylor hired an attorney to file a motion to reconsider the denial of ilis motion 
under Rule 35. That attorney did not file formally the motion and affidavit until after the 
hearing on the motion for reconsideration. (Tr.3 pg.49, L 1 - pg.54, L.7; R., pgs. 97-
101.). No apparent action appears in the record from these ·filings. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed unified sentences of 
fixed life in prision, no indeterminate, upon Mr. Taylor following his plea of guilty? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Taylor's Idaho 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When lt Imposed Unified Sentence Of Fixed 
Life. No Indeterminate Upon Mr. Taylor. Following His Plea Of 
Guilty 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Taylor's history, and the facts of this case, present mitigating circumstances 
indicating a need for temperance in sentencing. Nevertheless, the district court 
imposed six years upon Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor asserts that the district court failed to 
adequately consider the mitigating factors and, thus, abused its discretion, considering 
Mr. Taylor's lack of criminal history and his personal circumstances. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Unified Sentences Of 
Fixed Life, No Indeterminate Upon Mr. Taylor, Following His Plea Of Guilty. 
Law Regarding Sentencing. 
When fashioning a sentence, the court must consider 1. Protection of society; 2. 
Deterrence, both of the individual and the public; 3. Possibility of rehabilitation; and, 4. 
Punishment or retribution with the primary consideration being the good order and 
protection of society. State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (1982). With these goals in 
mind, the court must also have regard for the nature of the offense and tr.~ character of 
the offender. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (1982). 
Our Supreme Court has made clear that "to impose a fixed life sentence requires 
a h:gh degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely released back into 
society or if the offense is so egregious that it demands an exceptionally severe 
measure of retribution and deterrence." State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, _ 253 P.3d 
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310, 313 (2011). Mr. Taylor asserts that, given any view of the facts, his sentences of 
fixed life are excessive beyond the limits of discretion. Where a defendant contends 
tha~ the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court 
conducts an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 653 P .2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982). The Idaho Supreme 
Court states: 
the general objectives of sentence review are: 
i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having n1gard to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection 
of the public interest; 
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an 
opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence; 
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing 
power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and 
(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing 
which are both rational and just. 
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State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 144-145, 814 P.2d 401, 404-405 (1991), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 {1992), (citing 
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384-385, 582 P.2d 728, 730-731 (1978) and quoting ABA 
Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences at 7 (Approved Draft 1968)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has further held, m[w]here a sentence is within 
statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on 
the part of the court imposing the sentence.'» State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 
939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997), quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 
75 (1979). Mr. Taylor does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory 
maximum. Rather, Mr. Taylor contends that in light of the governin~ criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering a rational view of the facts. Id., ailing State v. 
Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,145,814 P.2d 401,405 (1991), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992). As noted above, the governing 
criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; 
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id., quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 
382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). 
Given the fact that Mr. Taylor admitted to a persistent v1olator enhancement, the 
district court had statutory authority to impose up to a life sentence. Therefore, Mr. 
Taylor did not ask for specific sentences for each count. Rather, Mr. Taylor asked this 
court to impose a sentence of 15 years fixed, with 15 years indeterminate,, v.·ith the 
sentences to be concurrent both with one another and with the sentences in Twin Falls 
County Case Nos. CR-2009-12678 and CR-2010-2612. (R., 189). 
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In support of this request, Mr. Taylor cited the following cases with which to 
compare to his case: 
State v. McE/hiney, Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2008-0660, U.e defendant 
was convicted of first-degree murder. Factually, the defendant admitted to murdering 
the victim through asphyxiation, over a $250.00 drug debt, and stuffing the body in a 
barr'el, to be disposed of at a later date. The Defendant had at least one prior felony for 
grand theft, and well over ten prior misdemeanor convictions. On April 10, 2009, he was 
sentenced to a unified sentence of life, with 22 years fixed. (R., 189). 
In State v. Trevino, Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2010-7621, the defendant 
pied guilty to second-degree murder with a deadly weapon enhancement. There, the 
district court bound itself to a Rule 11 plea agreement which waived any presentence 
investigation, and imposed a unified determinate sentence of 15 years in prison. (R., 
189). 
In the recent Jerome County case, State v. Keipper, 2010 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 333 (cited for illustrious purposes only and not as legal authority), the district court 
sentenced the defendant to a unified term of 6 years with 2 years fixed for involuntary 
manslaughter - which had originally been charged as second degree murder. In 
Keipper, the defendant had at least seven prior offenses at the time he was sentenced 
on the involuntary manslaughter charge. {R., 190). 
In State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330 (2009), the defendant shot two police officers 
who were attempting to serve a search warrant on the defendant at his residence. Both 
officers survived because they were protected by bulletproof vests. The defendant had 
a "lengthy criminal record" and "a number of his prior convictions were for ~rimes of 
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violence." These crimes included two separate convictions for kidnapping (one in 
Arizona and one in Idaho). The defendant had served prison time on both of these 
kidnapping charges. Ultimately, the defendant pied to one count of unlawful possession 
of a firearm and one count of aggravated battery on law enforcement officer. The Court 
of Appeals held that the sentence was within the bounds of discretion wht>n::the 
Defendant's cumulative sentence was .25 years fixed with 5 years indeterminate. 
In State v. Gootz, 110 Idaho 807 (1986), the defendant was on parole when he 
committed the offense at issue. In Gootz, the Defendant robbed someone at gunpoint. 
He then laid in wait for a law enforcement intern who was in pursuit, and shot the intern 
in the face as he (the [ntern) looked over the fence. The defendant was convicted 
robbery, aggravated battery, and possession of a firearm during commission of each 
crime. Id. at 809. Ultimately, the court of appeals affirmed a unified determinate 
sentence of 30 years fixed. 
Mr. Taylor argues that although he took full responsibility for his actions, the 
totality of facts in his case demonstrated less culpability than any of the above cases. 
Rather, in this case, Mr. Taylor unfortunately caused drastic harm through a series of 
poor decisions resulting from a lack of thought, and resulting from a variety of mitigating 
factors. 
This incident was precipitated by a culmination of troubling events in Mr. Taylor' 
life which led him to be unstable and suicidal at that time. For several days prior to the 
events of February 7, Mr. Taylor and his live-in girlfriend, Beth had been having serious 
relationship trouble. Mr. Taylor has an extreme substance abuse problem. (PSI, pp. 16-
17). Mr. Taylor had relapsed into his drug and alcohol addiction; he had been using 
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methamphetamine and drinking steadily for days prior to these events. Mr. Taylor was 
also depressed because of a long-term failure in his relationship with his mother. Thus, 
Mr. Taylor was very despondent and left the house on the afternoon of February 7, 
2011, with the intent of committing suicide. During the time he was being pursued by 
Officer Clark, Mr. Taylor called his father, Allan Mark Taylor "Mark", and to!d him that he 
was going to kill himself. It was Mark's driveway that Mr. Taylor momentariiy stopped in 
during the pursuit (300 South and 51 East in Jerome, Idaho). (PSI, pp. 4-5). 
Mr. Taylor immediately showed remorse, and asked whether Officer Clark was all 
right. Mr. Taylor gave a full confession of the events of February 7, 2011, and indicated 
that he was ready and willing to plead guilty. Although he knew or should have known 
that there was a high likelihood of hitting Officer Clark, Mr. Taylor did not intend to fire 
directly at Officer Clark, but rather fired at his patrol car. It was Mr. Taylor' hope at the 
time that the police officers would shoot and kill him. (PSI, pp. 4-5). 
While not minimizing the events of this case, unlike McE/h;ney and Trevino, this 
was not a case where a person lost his or her life. Additionally, unlike Gootz and Stone, 
or the other above cases, this was not a case where Mr. Taylor had planned or thought 
out a criminal act. Rather, this was a case where Mr. Taylor reacted very badly to the 
situation he was in and too, part in an unfortunate sequence of events and substance 
abuse which led to Mr. Taylor making a horrible decision. 
To impose a fixed life sentence requires a high degree of certainty that the 
defendant could not be safely released back into society. Windom, 253 P. 3d at 313 
(2011). A fixed life sentence should not be used as a judicial hedge against uncertainty. 
State v.Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). Rather, it is the role of the Idaho 
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Commission for Pardons and Parole that determines when an offender should be 
paroled. Protection of society is paramount in this decision, and Commission is best 
equipped to make this determination. Parole shall only be ordered "when, in the 
discretion of the commission, it is in the best interests of society, and the commission 
believes the prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law abiding citizen. 
LC.§ 20-223{c). More specifically, decisions regarding parole are discretionary and 
involve many criteria, including: 
1. Seriousness and aggravation and/or mitigation involved in the crime. 
2. Prior criminal history of inmate. 
3. Failure or success of past probation and parole. 
4. Institutional history, to include conformance to established rules, involvement in 
programs and jobs, custody level at time of hearing, and overall behavior. 
5. Evidence of the development of a positive social attitude and the willlngness to fulfill 
the obligations of a good citizen. 
6. Information or reports regarding physical or psychological condition. 
7. The strength and stability of the proposed parole plan, including adequate home 
placement and employment or maintenance and care. 
lDAPA 50.01 .01. Additionally, the victim of any crime may fully participate- and give 
testimony at any parole hearing. Id. 
Mr. Taylor contends that the Commission for Pardons and Parole is in the best 
pos!tion to determine when and whether a prisoner should be paroled. The Commission 
makes a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors at the time an inmate is being 
considered for parole. Therefore, Mr. Taylor contends that the district court should have 
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impose a reasonable determinate sentence of 15 years and allow the Commission for 
Pa1dons and Parole to make the determination as to when and if Mr. Taylor should be 
paroled. To have done otherwise constituted an impermissible "judicial hedge against 
uncertainty" and therefore an abuse of discretion. 
Mitigating Factors Must Be Considered. 
There are several mitigating factors this Court must consider when sentencing 
the Defendant. 
Mr. Taylor's substance abuse and mental health issues must be considered. 
He had a history of use of Marijuana at the age of 8, methamphetamine ~; the age of 
12. (PSI, pp. 16-17). He has been making bad choices his whole life because of 
substance abuse. (PSI, Mental Health Assessment, pp. 2, 16). The LMSW Marjean 
Flowers-Hazen opined that the core issues appear to be around Mr. Taylor's continued 
use of substances. Mr. Taylor has been using illegal substances since a very young age 
and he does not appear to have a very long period of time when he has been in the 
community when he has not used illegal substances. She recommended that Mr. Taylor 
receive substance abuse treatment as well as other classes that might be offered such 
as CSC or MRT. (PSI, Mental Health Assessment, p 17). 
Further, it must be noted that of the Mr. Taylor's prior offenses, 19 cases have 
been dismissed in their entirety. (PSI, pp. 5-11). All cases dismissed in thAir entirety 
should not be considered or weighed against Mr. Taylor. Of the remaining cases, 21 are 
simple driving offenses. Of those driving offenses, 16 are convictions for either Failure 
to Purchase a Driver's License or Driving Without Privileges. (PSI., pp. 5-11). When Mr. 
Taylor's criminal record is fully analyzed, it is apparent that the district court abused its 
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discretion when imposing fixed life. 
Additionally, the issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses 
remorse has been addressed in several cases. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 824 
P.2d 135 {Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is 
required when the defendant has expressed uremorse for his conduct, his recognition of 
his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his 
character." Id. at 209, 824 P.2d at 140. Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a 
defendant's term of imprisonment because the defendant expressed regret for what he 
had done. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,595, 65'1 P.2d 527,529 (1982). 
ln this case, Mr. Taylor has fully accepted responsibility for his actions and is 
extremely remorseful for his actions. 
Mr. Taylor has stated to this Court that: I think about that day every day & if I 
could go back & change my choices I made that day I would but I can't & I'm sorry I 
wasn't myseff that day & I wish that day never happened. I've never cried so much in my 
life & I hate myself every day that I wake up in jail and think about how much pain I've 
caused everyone. (PSI p. 18). 
Prosecutor's Statements re: appearance. 
Counsel for Mr. Taylor objected to the prosecutor's repeated statements 
regarding tattoos, and Mr. Taylor's appearance during his argument at sentencing. (Tr., 
p. 62, L 15 - p. 63, L.24.). Mr. Taylor contends that those comments constituted an 
improper inflammatory attack, and bordered on attempted testimony by th<:: prosecutor 
regarding the meaning of the tattoos. (See prosecutor's remarks at Tr., p.42, L.19 - 43, 
L.5; p.46, lines 16-22.). The State's inflammatory comments argued essentially for a 
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sentence based on revenge, rather than based on the permissible sentencing factors. 
The district court considered the tattoos, noting that it did not sentence "for 
tattoos", but that the words within the tattoos indicated a lack of respect for i:>dlf, society, 
and authority to the district court. (Tr., p.85, lines 2-13.). Though the district court 
indicated it did not sentence for tattoos, it went on to draw a conclusion about Mr. Taylor 
based on the tattoos. Mr. Taylor submits that this displays an abuse of discretion, and 
sentencing based on a lack of the exercise of reason, and demonstrates that the district 
court sentenced based on inflammatory factors and an argument based on revenge and 
other impermissible factors. Therefore, the sentence should be overturned. 
In sum, in light of the facts of the his case and of his personal circumstances, and 
in light of the conduct of the sentencing hearing herein, Mr. Taylor asserts that the 
district court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors, considered improper 
factors, failed to exericise reason and, thus, abused its discretion. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Taylor's Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence Because The Sentence Was 
Excessive As Initially Imposed 
A Introduction 
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Counsel for Mr. Taylor did not present any new information in support of the Rule 
35 motion for a reduction of sentence. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor asserts that the dfstrict 
court abused its discretion when it denied the motion because his s~ntence was 
excessive as initially imposed. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Taylor Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence Because The 
Sentence Was Excessive As Initially Imposed 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may 
be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 
Idaho 251,253,869 P.2d 568,570 (Ct.App.1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 
740 P.2d 63 (Ct.App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P.2d 869 
{Ct.App.1984). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are 
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was 
reasonable." Id., citing Lopez, 106 Idaho a 450, 680 P.2d at 872. "If the sentence was 
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in 
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction, Id,, citing 
State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct.App.1991). 
Counsel for Mr. Taylor did not submit any new information or documentation in 
support of his Rule 35 motion. Therefore, he respectfully contends that the district court 
should have reduced his sentence pursuant to the Rule 35 motion because the 
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sentence was excessive as originally imposed because the court should have allowed 
him more time to secure treatment out on probation. His arguments in support of this 
assertion are found above, and need not be repeated. They are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Taylor respectfully requests that this court reduce his sentenca as it deems 
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 
35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this _I_ day of February, 2013. 
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S PHEN . THOMPSON 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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